T he significant threat of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure can motivate metric development. Physical destruction is not the only threat to critical infrastructure systems 1 -if a system such as an electric grid suffers a cyberattack and cannot accurately control power distribution using computer networks, such as the Internet, the effect could be as disastrous as a direct terrorist attack on power plants or transmission lines. 2 In the US, almost every economic and social function is based in some way on energy distribution, telecommunication services, and transportation services. A successful cyberattack on these infrastructures would have devastating effects on the economy and public life. 3 In addition, President Barack Obama says that the US must begin building a "smart grid," which would make the country less vulnerable to blackouts or even attacks, in addition to saving money and aiding renewable energy.
The costs of worms, viruses, and other malicious software (malware) attacks have been significant. The number of such attacks reported has gone from near zero in the mid 1990s (four attacks reported in 1995) to roughly 200,000 in 2003. Cost estimates for cyberattacks, including hacking, malware, and spam, have gone from US$1 billion in 1996 to $56 billion in 2004. 1 The estimated costs include business interruption, denial of service (DoS), data theft or deletion, loss of sensitive To achieve their full potential, networks must be secure as well as functional. With this in mind, the author identifies metrics designed to mitigate vulnerabilities to cyberattacks in networks that are key to the critical infrastructure of the US. He discusses both growth metrics -based on data obtained from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology and Department of Homeland Security vulnerability database -and metrics designed to mitigate the risk of security vulnerabilities in networks. If used together, these two types of metrics can help make networks more secure.
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Metrics for Mitigating Cybersecurity Threats intelligence or intellectual property, loss of reputation, and share-price declines. 4 Unfortunately, the threat is not confined to organizations such as public utilities. Rather, it's pervasive, involving, for example, financial, investment, and information distribution institutions; even popular social networking organizations are vulnerable to attack. Thus efforts to mitigate the threat of vulnerabilities should be universal.
Multivector threat weapons attempt to exploit a diverse array of security vulnerabilities to gain access to a system. Buffer overflows, HTTP input validation vulnerabilities, and known default passwords are just a few common entry points for these hybrid threats. We are continually discovering vulnerabilities in all kinds of email, Web, chat, file transfer, and other services and functions. It is well known that many of these vulnerabilities are not patched immediately (or at all) because system administrators are increasingly overwhelmed by the sheer volume of vulnerability reports and advisories. Attackers can incorporate any combination of these ubiquitous vulnerabilities -or even as yet undisclosed flaws -into a dangerous tool. Once the malicious code has gained access to a system, it can propagate and execute its payload. So, we can assume that the incidence of attacks is proportional to the presence of vulnerabilities 5 and thus mitigate the consequences of an attack on facilities such as the electric grid by forecasting such vulnerabilities and their rate of change.
The existing federal incident reporting system contains qualitative attack information but does not support quantitative vulnerability assessment. Thus, the security community must focus on developing vulnerability forecasting equations from publicly available sources that organizations can use to predict vulnerability to cyberattacks based on various factors. I have designed several metrics that could help avert the risks of vulnerabilities.
Cyber Incident Reporting System
One reason for developing metrics systems is that although the following incident categories and reporting system are useful, they are qualitative; require too much information to be reported, which can lead to disuse; and have no statistical or forecasting capability. The last point is crucial because although we cannot do anything about the past, we can proactively mitigate the effects of cyberattacks that are likely to occur in the future by quantitatively forecasting vulnerabilities.
The US federal government's cyberattack reporting system is issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As NIST Special Publication 800-61 defines, a computer security incident within the federal government is a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard computer security practices (see http://csrc.nist.gov/ publications/nistpubs/800-61/sp800-61.pdf ).
Reports of computer security incidents should include a description of the incident or event, using the appropriate taxonomy and as much of the following information as possible (however, reporting shouldn't be delayed to gain additional information):
• agency name;
• point-of-contact information, including name, telephone number, and email address; • incident category type (that is, CAT 1 or CAT 2; see Table 1 ); • incident date and time, including time zone; • source IP, port, and protocol; • destination IP, port, and protocol; • operating system, including the version, patches; • system function (for example, DNS/Web server or workstation); • antivirus software installed, including version and latest updates; • location of the systems involved in the incident (Washington, DC, or Los Angeles, for example); • method used to identify the incident, audit log analysis, system administrator); • impact to agency; and • resolution.
Technical Approach
The approach I propose is to develop risk-based metrics that can identify system vulnerabilities and detect anomalous system behavior 6 to mitigate Internet cyberattack effects. 7 The goal is to reduce the risk of cyberattack on the US's critical infrastructure. We can link these metrics to the operations of critical infrastructure control functions, such as multilayered electric grid systems (for instance, substation networks www.computer.org/internet/ IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING linked via the Internet). Although I use the electric grid as an example for explaining the technical approach, the metrics and the metrics development process are applicable to all critical infrastructure systems. It would be convenient to have a single metric, say, on a scale of 1 to 100, to capture the cyberattack threat. However, cybersecurity is a multivariable problem, and attempting to mix the variables in a single metric would obscure each variable's contribution to a system's vulnerability.
Vulnerability Forecasting Metrics
To provide a framework for analyzing metrics, we can divide the metrics into the following categories: severity, type of vulnerability (for example, buffer-overflow error), vulnerability by type of system access (network, adjacent network, and local), and vendor source of vulnerability. I base this categorization on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). 8 The data I used in computing the metrics is from the publicly available NIST/DHS National Vulnerability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov), which comprises data collected from realworld networks. Because these are time-series data, and the objective is to develop forecasting metrics, I plot the data and use regression analysis to construct forecasting equations. If you wish to analyze cybersecurity for your particular network, you would start by determining whether there is any historical vulnerability data for that network. If so, you would plot the vulnerability count over time and use regression analysis to develop forecasting equations. If you lack data, use the NIST/DHS data to develop forecasting equations. In addition to being collected from actual networks, the data is reported by major network vendors. Thus, you could use data corresponding to your vendorsupplied network and develop representative forecasting equations. The National Vulnerability Database contains a CVSS 2 calculator that was used for Figures 1 and 2 show the first category, severity. Figure 1 plots the actual any (that is, all severities), high, medium, and low severities for the period from 1988 to 2007, as the NIST/DHS vulnerability database defines them. The reason for the decrease in 2007 is that not all of the data for that year had been reported when I conducted this analysis. In addition, I fitted a curve to the any category plot so that I could develop a vulnerability predictor for 2008. A very good fit, represented by R 2 , shows that vulnerabilities are increasing at an exponential rate, which would be an alert to security personnel to mitigate those vulnerabilities' consequences. Figure 2 shows both the predicted any count and its rate of change. Given that the predictor is an exponential function, the rate of change is proportional to the count. Because we can expect attacks proportional to vulnerabilities, this doesn't bode well for the IT community. These forecasts serve as alerts that it should take action to mitigate the threat of cyberattacks, such as intrusion-detection monitors installed at the interface of local networks and the Internet, as Figure 3 shows. (I could have used many networks to portray the cyber threat -I use the substation diagram in Figure 3 because it illustrates the threat to the US's electric grid mentioned previously.) Thus, you can see that a good way to assess the criticality of vulnerabilities over time is to forecast their rate of change. An increasing trend foretells an increasing threat.
Severity
Type of Vulnerability
The second category -type of vulnerability -also exhibits exponential growth. To illustrate this growth, Figure 4 shows two types of vulnerability: buffer overflow and software design errors. The first type represents the consequences of DoS attacks, which in many cases lead to buffer overflow; this type is growing at a fast clip. A good countermeasure is to use a buffer size limit and check it on every access to the buffer. The second type is under the software engineer's control; all code should be secure from internal and external corruption. Fitting a predictor function to these data was not possible because R 2 , the fraction of depen- Figure 2 . The vulnerability count V(t) and the rate of change in V(t). Given that the predictor is an exponential function, the rate of change is proportional to the count. www.computer.org/internet/ IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING dent variable variation accounted for by independent variable variation, was low. Table 2 shows the major contributors to software flaws in 2007 by type of vulnerability error, along with the corresponding countermeasures. The database has so many categories that a given one doesn't represent a large percentage of total vulnerabilities for 2007, but the table shows the more significant ones. Many of the vulnerability types in Table 2 aren't new to IT. Protection against buffer overflow, design and code inspections, checking input data to see that it doesn't corrupt the program, and checks to determine the validity of access were considered good software development practices long before the cyber threat -thus, just enforcing these practices would go a long way toward mitigating that threat. Figure 5 dramatically shows that when we analyze the type of access, we should really worry about network connectivity and the consequences of Internet attacks. 9, 10 Not only does this vulnerability grow exponentially, but it also accounts for 91 percent of access problems reported in 2007 (as opposed to 9 percent for local access). Furthermore, network vulnerabilities' rate of change will track vulnerabilities at a proportionality constant of 0.4893, as the prediction equation shows. We can have confidence in the predictor V (t) because of R 2 's high value. An example of a countermeasure is the packet filter that's installed between the substation network and the Internet in Figure 3 .
Type of Access Category
Vendor Source Category Figure 6 shows the last category, vendor source of vulnerabilities, which is both interesting and requires some caveats. As expected, Microsoft leads the pack, but vulnerabilities attributed to Hewlett-Packard (HP) are rapidly growing. However, the counts depend on the frequency of reporting, which in part reflects the vendor market share. A case in point is HP's position as the number one PC vendor. Despite these caveats, these plots give users a rough assessment of the relative cyber threat incurred when they use certain vendor software and hardware.
Risk Aversion Metrics
Because the growth metrics do not tell the entire story of how to mitigate the cyber threat, particularly with respect to vulnerability risk, Table  3 shows additional metrics with an accompanying metrics development process in Figure 7 . We can assume that attackers can gain access to the periphery of critical infrastructure systems, so my focus is on preventing further intrusion if this occurs, as the examples in Table 3 and Figure 7 show. This particular set of metrics was motivated by vulnerabilities existing in the substation network that Figure 3 shows. Other metrics would be applicable to other applications. For example, a hacker could compromise a user's Web search and obtain information to access that user's computer. So, for this application, we would define a vulnerability metric as "illegal access to Web search" and a risk mitigation action as "ensuring that vendor's search engine is secure."
Although no attack data is available from the CVSS database, an organization that has been subject to attacks could record those attacks' characteristics (for example, DoS) and correlate these data with vulnerability data, as Figure  7 shows, to identify metric thresholds that are appropriate for the types of attacks (see Table 3 ).
T
oo many metrics are difficult to learn and manage and are expensive to implement due to the labor cost involved in, for example, monitoring for anomalous activity to mitigate against DoS attacks. So, I suggest using only those metrics that are relevant for your orga- nization's security system. In Table 3 , "metric threshold" corresponds to the metric value when risk mitigation is invoked. Not all these metrics would necessarily be allocable to all organizations. Based on past vulnerabilities, an organization could select metrics that are most applicable to its environment. For example, if an attacker has hacked an organization from the outside, installing a firewall is easy to do and could provide the most benefit for the investment. Many attacks originate from inside an organization, however, so organizations should adopt risk aversion metrics, such as the access control lists and code-scanning tools Table 3 lists, to prevent access to critical resources by unauthorized personnel.
In addition to these risk-mitigation ac tions, cryptography and user authentication are useful for preventing break-ins to critical infrastructures. 
